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I. STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
 
Belle Ranch, LLC (“Belle Ranch”) owns 289 acres of real property and appurtenant 
water rights 37-481C, 37-482H, 37-483C, 37-577BT, and 37-2630 (“Water Rights”) in Blaine 
County, south and east of Bellevue.  Belle Ranch purchased this Property in December 2011 
with loan proceeds provided by Rabo Agrifinance, Inc., now known as Rabo AgriFinance LLC 
(“RABO”), and ever since has farmed and irrigated the entire property with all 289 acres of the 
Water Rights.  RABO holds a purchase money security interest in the real property and 
appurtenant Water Rights.  Five Water Rights irrigate this property and have done so for many 
years.  All Water Rights are appurtenant to the entire 289 acres.  Four rights are surface water 
rights from the Big Wood River and one is from ground water.  Appellants claim to be 
successors-in-interest to other successors-in-interest of a defunct LLC, South County Estates 
LLC (“South County”) that held this property for a time and defaulted on the mortgages when it 
was unable to develop the property.  Appellants claim that the three former managers/members 
of this defunct LLC stripped off some of the water rights, placed the rights in their own name, 
and conveyed their interests to Appellants.  Appellants claim that this purported interest in a 
portion of the Water Rights are senior and superior to the rights of Belle Ranch and RABO. 
Appellants claim no interest in the land, nor do they claim to have ever put the water to 
beneficial use.  The district court, Judge Brody, quieted title to the Water Rights in the name of 
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B. Course of the Proceedings 
 
1. Initial Pleadings. 
 
On December 2, 2016, First Security Corporation (“FSC”) filed a quiet title action 
against Belle Ranch, members Justin Flood Stevenson and Brett Stevenson, and RABO to quiet 
title to 7.5/289ths of the Water Rights on the Belle Ranch Property.  R. 14.1  The complaint was 
served December 15, 2016.  On December 21, 2016, Belle Ranch filed a quiet title action against 
the prior owner, South County, its member/managers, FSC, and the bank that conveyed the land 
to Belle Ranch, Mountain West Bank (“MWB”) and its successor GBCI Other Real Estate LLC 
(“GBCI”), to confirm title to the Water Rights.  R2. 10. Big Stick LLC, Richard Fosbury and 
Charles Holt filed a third quiet title action against Belle Ranch and RABO, on December 28, 
2016 seeking an interest in 7.8/289ths of the Water Rights on the Belle Ranch Property. R3. 9.   
FSC, Big Stick, Holt and Fosbury all claimed to derive an interest in the Water Rights from 
South County. The three cases were consolidated on May 23, 2017. R. 374.  The non-Belle 
Ranch parties asserted claims to a total of 15.3/289ths of the Water Rights. R. 14, R3. 9.  Only 
Belle Ranch asserted any interest in the remaining 273.7/289ths of these five Water Rights. Id.; 
R2.10. Thus, it is undisputed that Belle Ranch owns at least 273/289ths of the Water Rights, and 
the dispute here focuses only on the remaining 15.3/289ths of the Water Rights. 
2. Cross Motions for Summary Judgment. 
 
The parties filed motions and cross-motions for summary judgment. R. 376, 384, 909. 
The district court heard oral argument on September 19, 2017, and the motions were taken under 
                                                 
1 Respondents will keep the references to the Record consistent with Appellants’ Opening Brief. The primary record 
is 2,064 pages in length, and will be referenced as “R.__.” The second record is 376 pages in length and will be 
referenced as “R2. __.” The third record is 271 pages (or 311 by appellants’ count) and will be referenced as 
“R3.__”. Most references shall be to the primary record. 
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advisement. R. 1750-51. Belle Ranch’s2 Cross Motion for Summary Judgment sought judgment 
on a number of legal grounds.3  
On October 30, 2017, the district court issued a written Memorandum Decision on Cross-
Motions for Summary Judgment Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.  R. 
1755-65. Of the 15.3/289ths Water Rights at issue – the district court quieted title to 12.5/289ths in 
the name of Belle Ranch. Id.  The district court’s decision rested on its analysis on the purported 
transfer documents and the effect of the unreleased mortgages held by MWB on those purported 
transfers. Id.  The district court held that there were issues of fact that precluded summary 
judgment on remaining the 2.8/289ths of the Water Rights claimed by Belle Ranch and Big Stick. 
Id.   
3. Motion for Reconsideration 
 
Big Stick, Fosbury, Holt and FSC filed a Motion for Reconsideration on November 13, 
2017.  R. 1766-69; R. 1780-82.  The motions were fully briefed.  On February 6, 2018, the 
matter was argued and taken under advisement.  R. 1862-63.  While the motions were under 
consideration, this Court issued its decision in In Re SRBA Case No. 39576, Subcase No. 37-
00864,164 Idaho 241, 429 P.3d 129 (2018).  (“Eden”). The district court concluded that the res 
judicata and collateral estoppel issues addressed by this Court in Eden might affect the court’s 
decision.  The court then held a status conference, and provided the parties additional time to 
brief the effect of Eden.  R. 1887-88.   
                                                 
2 Throughout the underlying litigation Belle Ranch and RABO took joint positions on the issues in dispute.  For 
purposes of this appeal, and where appropriate, the phrase “Belle Ranch” should be construed to mean both Belle 
Ranch and its secured lender, RABO. 
3(1) statute of limitations; (2) the purported quitclaim deeds did not transfer title because of the outstanding 
unreleased mortgages; (3) the Water Rights remain appurtenant to Belle Ranch property, in which the Appellants 
have no interest; (4) the SRBA decree was preclusive; (5) the transfer proceeding for the Water Rights precluded 
claimants from later asserting any interest in the Water Rights; (6) waiver and estoppel; (7) abandonment and 
forfeiture; and that (8) there were issues of fact surrounding the fraudulent transfer of the water rights from South 
County to its managers/members. 
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The motions were once again taken under advisement on March 22, 2018, and on April 
23, 2018, the district court issued its Memorandum Decision on Motion to Reconsider Cross 
Motion for Summary Judgment. R.1919-34.  The district court re-affirmed its original decision, 
and also addressed the arguments pertaining to res judicata effect of the SRBA decrees and held 
that all Appellants’ claims were barred.  Id.  Judgment was entered on May 8, 2018, quieting title 
to the entirety of water right nos. 37-481C, 37-482H, 37-483C, 37-577BT and 37-2630 in the 
name of Belle Ranch. R. 1935-38.   
4. Motion to Correct Judgment 
 
On June 18, 2019, FSC filed a motion to “correct” the Judgment under Rule 60(a), asking 
the district court to insert language referring to FSC’s attempt to create new water right numbers.  
R. 1954-57.  Belle Ranch opposed the motion to correct Judgment as unnecessary and too 
narrow.  On September 12, 2018, the district court issued an order denying the motion because 
there was no mistake in the Judgment and it correctly disallowed all prior splits of the five Water 
Rights.   
5. Post-Appeal Proceedings 
 
The day after FSC filed its motion to “correct” the Judgment, FSC filed its Notice of 
Appeal.  R. 1958.  Fosbury, Holt and Big Stick filed a separate Notice of Appeal.  R. 2015.  On 
September 6, 2018, Fosbury, Holt and Big Stick filed a Notice of Substitution of Party with this 
Court asserting that Big Stick and Holt had assigned their “interests in the case” to Fosbury.  No 
actual assignment was filed.  On September 24, 2018, the Court issued an Order Granting 
Substitution of Party Fosbury for Holt and Big Stick, and amending the caption.  On October 4, 
2018, counsel for FSC substituted in as counsel also for Fosbury. See Notice of Substitution of 
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Counsel. After previously consolidating the appeals for record and transcript purposes, the Court 
granted an uncontested Motion to consolidate the appeals for all purposes on April 10, 2019.   
C. Statement of Facts 
 
Appellants’ Statement of Facts is lengthy and convoluted, but nevertheless incomplete.  It 
does not do justice to the obscure timing and manner in which South County and its 
manager/members engaged in self-dealing through a series of exchanges and purported releases 
and the numerous documents they executed and recorded or filed in the county recorder’s office, 
with the SRBA court and with IDWR in relation to these water rights claims.  Significantly, the 
Appellants’ Statement of Facts omits important material and undisputed facts.  Accordingly, 
Belle Ranch must provide this Court with additional context.  Belle Ranch has attached a table as 
Exhibit A to assist in understanding the timing of the execution, and recordation of the numerous 
quitclaim deeds, mortgages, and documents recorded with the county recorder’s office.  This 
table also appears at R.1706-07. Belle Ranch has also attached a table as Exhibit B to assist in 
understanding the timing of documents and orders filed before IDWR and the SRBA.  
1. The Belle Ranch Property. 
 
The Belle Ranch Property is located in Blaine County and consists of 289 acres.  All the 
Water Rights are appurtenant to the same 289 acres, including the 15.3/289ths interest in the 
water rights claimed by Appellants.  Respondent, Belle Ranch, owns the Belle Ranch Property 
and the appurtenant Water Rights.  R. 1467.  It purchased the land and Water Rights in 
December 2011 using loan proceeds from RABO, and it is undisputed that Belle Ranch is a 
bonafide purchaser for value of the Belle Ranch Property. Id.  The entire 289 acres is irrigated 
farmland, and is currently irrigated by all the Water Rights.  Before Belle Ranch acquired the 
Belle Ranch Property, the entire property was irrigated by the same Water Rights.  R. 1061.  
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These rights are stacked rights, limiting irrigation to a combined total of 289 acres.  R. 1167. 
The Water Rights are as follows: 
Water Rights Priority Date Div. Rate Source 
37-481C Aug. 1, 1882 3.014 cfs Big Wood River 
37-482H Aug. 1, 1884 3.012 cfs Big Wood River 
37-483C Aug. 1, 1902 15.086 cfs Big Wood River 
37-577BT Mar. 24, 1883 2.2 cfs Big Wood River 
37-2630 Feb. 2, 1960 3.75 cfs Groundwater 
 
Since Belle Ranch acquired the property, it has consistently and timely paid all 
assessments due to the water district (“WD 37”) and to the irrigation district (“Triangle ID”) for 
delivery of the entirety of these Water Rights. R2. 10.  Belle Ranch has also continuously put the 
full amount of the Water Rights to beneficial use on the Belle Ranch Property from the date of 
acquisition through the present. Id.   
Water delivery records prepared by the Watermaster of WD 37 show that all the Water 
Rights have been delivered to the same headgate on Belle Ranch Property, in the same 
approximate quantity since 2003. R. 1061-1063. These records also show that the water had been 
delivered to “Scherer” at this same property from 2003 through 2011. Id. The water delivery 
records from 2012 forward show that the water was delivered to Belle Ranch at the same 
headgate. Id.  The water delivery reports do not show that any of the Appellants have ever 
received any water under these Water Rights.  Id.  Appellants do not claim to have diverted any 
water or put it to beneficial use.  
2. South County Estates, LLC. 
 
South County was formed in 2003 and dissolved in 2011.  R. 968, 1594-98.  John Scherer 
(“Scherer”) was the “Managing Member,” R. 1594-98.  Richard Fosbury (“Fosbury”), and 
Charles Holt (“Holt”) were also members.  R. 970-1025.  In 2003, South County acquired the 
Belle Ranch Property and appurtenant water rights.   South County filed notice of change in 
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Water Right Ownership with the Idaho Department of Water Resources (“IDWR”) changing the 
name of the owner to South County. R. 970-1025.  Various quitclaim deeds showing ownership 
of South County were attached. Id. 
In October 2005, South County executed a Mortgage (Instrument #527439) against the 
Belle Ranch Property and appurtenant Water Rights with MWB. (“MWB”). R. 1444-49. A 
Modification of Mortgage was subsequently recorded December 01, 2006 (Instrument #542378), 
which stated the amount borrowed—$5,670,000.00. R. 1027-28. South County executed a 
second mortgage against the Belle Ranch Property and appurtenant Water Rights which was 
recorded June 13, 2008 (Instrument #558904) in the amount of $1,040,000.00. R. 1030-38. South 
County executed a third mortgage against the Property and Water Rights which was recorded 
October 24, 2008 (Instrument #562481), in the amount of $249,000.00. R. 1040-47.  Scherer, 
Fosbury and Holt, the members of South County guaranteed the mortgage or note to MWB. See 
R. 10494.   
South County defaulted on its nearly seven million dollars in loans from MWB. Instead 
of facing foreclosure on the notes and Mortgages, and on the guaranty liability of Scherer, Holt 
and Fosbury, South County executed a Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure to MWB, which was 
recorded on June 17, 2010. R. 1460-62. At that time, no portion of the Water Rights had been 
moved off of the property by a transfer proceeding and the entirety of the Water Rights remained 
in South County’s name. The Deed in Lieu provided that the conveyance included all 
appurtenances, including “all water, water rights, watercourses and ditch rights (including stock 
in utilities with ditch or irrigation rights).” R. 1461.  The Deed in Lieu also included the “TO 
HAVE AND HOLD” clause to MWB for the property with the appurtenances. Id. 
                                                 
4 Such a guaranty document was not produced, however the estoppel certificate specifically mentions the release of 
these individual guarantees. R. 1049-1052. 
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In conjunction with the Deed in Lieu, South County executed an Estoppel Certificate 
recorded the same day (Instrument #578332). R. 1049-52.  South County’s Estoppel Certificate 
expressly stated that the conveyance included “appurtenances”, including “all water, water 
rights, watercourses and ditch rights (including stock in utilities with ditch or irrigation rights.” 
R. 1050. At that time, and ever since, the entirety of the five Water Rights were appurtenant to 
the Belle Ranch Property.  Of this there is no dispute.  The Estoppel Certificate also included all 
Partial Releases described below. Id. It confirmed that the Deed in Lieu was an “absolute 
conveyance” of the property and included with the property was all appurtenances, including “all 
water [and] water rights”.  Id. This Deed in Lieu was exchanged for a release of all obligations 
under the Mortgages and the guaranty liabilities of Scherer, Fosbury and Holt. Id. 
Simultaneously, on June 17, 2010, MWB transferred the property to GBCI. R.100-02.  
On or about December 20 or 21, 2011, GBCI executed a Special Warranty Deed and MWB 
executed a Quitclaim Deed to the Belle Ranch Property and Water Rights to Belle Ranch. R. 
120, 123. The deeds expressly stated that they conveyed “without limitation, Water Right Nos. 
37-481C, 37-577BT, 37-482H, 37-2630 and 37-483C.” At that time, no changes to the Water 
Rights had been made in the SRBA and none appeared in the IDWR records.  
Contemporaneously with this transfer, counsel to MWB advised that the five Water Rights 
appurtenant to the Belle Ranch Property were all acquired by MWB and available to irrigate the 
entire 289 acres of the Property.  R. 1709-1710. 
In conjunction with the conveyance of the Belle Ranch Property and Water Rights to 
Belle Ranch, a Title Commitment was issued by Stewart Title Guaranty Company. R. 1054-
1059. The Title Commitment includes the results of an exhaustive title search on the property 
and included, in Schedule B, a list of items of note relative to the title of the Property. Id. 
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Importantly, although the Title Commitment did reference the Releases, the title search did not 
uncover any of the quitclaim deeds, described below, purporting to convey portions of the Water 
Rights. Id. (Schedule B, Part I, Item 5). Merely stating that the first mortgage lien was released is 
not evidence that the second or third mortgages had been released or that any portion of the 
Water Rights had been conveyed.  
3. Void Conveyance of 15.3/289ths of the Water Rights to Scherer, Holt, Fosbury or 
Related Affiliates (Quitclaim Deeds and Partial Releases). 
 
Before the SRBA partial decrees were issued, South County purported to make seven 
attempts, via quitclaim deeds, to convey fractional portions (totaling 15.3/289ths) of the Water 
Rights to its mangers/members, Scherer, Holt, Fosbury and/or their affiliated entities, accounts or 
holdings. R. 1065,1077,1085,1093,1101,1109,1117. Neither South County nor the purported 
grantees ever attempted to transfer those Water Rights to any other real property. 
a) Big Stick, LLC (Scherer, managing Member) Quitclaim Deed and Partial 
Release. 
 
On December 7, 2007, South County executed a Quitclaim Deed (Instrument #554098) to 
Big Stick, LLC (Big Stick) for 2.8/289ths of the Water Rights. R. 1065. This Quitclaim Deed was 
recorded on December 14, 2007. Id.  Scherer was the managing member of both Big Stick and 
South County. R.1392.  On October 14, 2009, a Partial Release of Lien was executed from 
MWB to Big Stick (Instrument #574996). R. 1073-75. This partial release was not recorded until 
February 10, 2010. Id.  No Notice of Change of ownership associated with this purported 
quitclaim of these portions of the water rights was filed with IDWR or the SRBA Court. 
b) Holt IRA (#HO1NH, #HO1NV) Quitclaim Deed and Partial Release. 
 
On April 28, 2008, South County executed a Quitclaim Deed (Instrument #575488) to 
Holt IRA #H01NH for 1/289ths of the Water Rights. R. 1077-83. This quitclaim was not recorded 
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until March 1, 2010. Id. A Partial Release of Lien (Instrument #575000) was executed on 
October 14, 2009, and subsequently recorded on February 10, 2010. R.1428-30. This partial lien 
release covered only MWB liens on this fraction of the Water Rights under the first mortgage.  
Id.  It did not release the liens attached under either MWB’s second or third mortgages.  Id.  On 
August 8, 2008, South County executed a Quitclaim Deed to Holt IRA #HO1NV (Instrument 
#575489) for 1/289ths of the Water Rights. R. 1085-92. This quitclaim was not recorded until 
March 1, 2010. Id. A Partial Release of Lien (Instrument #575999) was executed on October 14, 
2009, and not recorded until February 10, 2010. R.1432-34. This partial lien release covered only 
MWB liens on this fraction of the Water Rights under the first mortgage.  It did not release the 
liens attached under either MWB’s second or third mortgages.  On April 8, 2009, South County 
executed a Quitclaim Deed to Holt IRA #H01NV (Instrument # 575490) for 1/289ths of the 
Water Rights. R. 1094-99. This quitclaim was not recorded until March 1, 2010. A Partial 
Release of Lien (Instrument #575001) was executed on October 14, 2009 and not recorded until 
February 10, 2010. R.1436-38. This partial lien release covered only MWB liens on this fraction 
of the Water Rights under the first mortgage.  It did not release the liens attached under either 
MWB’s second or third mortgages.  No transfer of these portions of the water rights was filed 
with IDWR. 
c) Fosbury IRA Quitclaim Deed and Partial Release. 
 
On March 17, 2008, South County executed a Quitclaim Deed to Fosbury IRA 
(Instrument # 575491) for 1/289ths of the Water Rights. R.1101-07. This quitclaim was not 
recorded until March 1, 2010. A Partial Release of Lien (Instrument #574998) was executed on 
October 14, 2009 and not recorded until February 10, 2010. R.1420-22. This partial lien release 
covered only MWB liens on this fraction of the Water Rights under the first mortgage.  It did not 
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release the liens attached under either MWB’s second or third mortgages.  On September 18, 
2008, South County executed a Quitclaim Deed to Fosbury IRA (Instrument # 575492) for 
1/289ths of the Water Rights. R. 1109. This quitclaim was not recorded until March 1, 2010. A 
Partial Release of Lien (Instrument #574997) was executed on October 14, 2009 and recorded on 
February 10, 2010. R.1424-26. This partial lien release covered only MWB liens on this fraction 
of the Water Rights under the first mortgage.  It did not release the liens attached under either 
MWB’s second or third mortgages.  No transfer of these portions of the water right was filed 
with IDWR. 
d) Holt and Scherer Quitclaim Deed and Partial Release And FSC’s Claim. 
 
On June 25, 2009, South County executed and recorded a Quitclaim Deed to Holt and 
Scherer (Instrument #568680) for 7.5/289ths of the Water Rights. R. 1117-22. A Partial Release 
of Lien (Instrument #568681) was executed and recorded on June 25, 2009. R.1478-79. This 
partial lien release covered only MWB liens on this fraction of the Water Rights under the first 
mortgage.  It did not release the liens attached under either MWB’s second or third mortgages.  
Scherer and Holt executed a Mortgage (Instrument #568682) in favor of Idaho Independent Bank 
(“IIB”) as to the purported 7.5/289ths interest in the Water Rights.  On or about September 2, 
2014, Scherer and Holt defaulted on their obligation to IIB and executed a Non-Merger Deed 
(Instrument #622055). R. 1124-28. The Non-merger Deed was recorded on October 20, 2014, 
the same day that IIB granted via warranty deed to FSC an alleged interest in the 7.5/289ths of the 
Water Rights.  R. 1474-76.  This purported quitclaim is the sole basis for FSC’s claim to any of 
the Water Rights. 
Each of the above purported quitclaims of a fractional share of the Water Rights have the 
following in common:  
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I. the entirety of the Water Rights have at all times remained appurtenant to the 
Belle Ranch Property owned by, titled in the name of, and used by Belle Ranch; 
 
II. the record owner of the Belle Ranch Property (i.e., Belle Ranch) has continually 
paid assessments for, diverted and beneficially used the Water Rights on the Belle 
Ranch Property; 
 
III. none of the persons or entities who allegedly acquired any fractional portion of 
the Water Rights have made any attempt to divert and/or beneficially use any 
portion of the Water Rights. 
 
IV. none of these conveyances were ever the subject of any transfers filed with IDWR 
to move the water to any other property. 
 
V. at the time of South County’s default and execution of Deed in Lieu of 
Foreclosure and Estoppel Certificate, the Water Rights remained in the name of 
South County.  
 
VI. the quitclaim deeds purporting to transfer a portion of the water right did not show 
up in any Title Commitment.  
 
VII. the Partial Releases identify only the 2005 Mortgage (Instrument #527439) and 
Modification of Mortgage (Instrument No. 542378) The Partial Releases did not 
release any of the other outstanding mortgages or encumbrances, including 
Instrument No. 558904 or Instrument No. 56248 (i.e., the second and third MWB 
mortgages, recorded in June and October of 2008, respectively. 
 
VIII. All of the purported transfers by quitclaim were recorded after the MWB second 
and third mortgages were recorded in 2008, except the 2.8/289ths interest 
purportedly transferred to Big Stick and recorded in 2007. 
 
4. Adjudication in the SRBA Belle Ranch Transfer Proceeding and Records Of 
Ownership with IDWR (See Exhibit B) 
 
In 1988, the predecessor owner of the Belle Ranch Property, G. Chapman Petersen, filed 
notices of claim in the Snake River Basin Adjudication (“SRBA”) for the five Water Rights 
appurtenant to the Belle Ranch Property. R. 1130.  In 2003, South County acquired the Belle 
Ranch Property and appurtenant Water Rights, and filed a notice of change in Water Right 
Ownership with IDWR in the name of South County along with various quitclaim deeds.  R. 
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970-1025.  
In early 2007, the Director of IDWR issued recommendations in the SRBA, in Basin 37, 
recommending that the Water Rights be decreed to authorize 289 acres of irrigation for 
beneficial use on the Belle Ranch Property. R. 1143-47. South County was listed as the owner of 
the Water Rights. Id.  On June 28, 2010, the SRBA Court issued a Special Master’s Report and 
Recommendation for each of the Water Rights, recommending (i) that the Water Rights be 
decreed, in their entirety, to South County, and (ii) that the entirety of the Water Rights are 
appurtenant to the 289 acres of the Belle Ranch Property. R. 1149.  On July 9, 2010, the SRBA 
Court issued an Amended Special Master’s Report and Recommendation, continuing to 
recommend that each of the Water Rights be decreed, in their entirety, in the name of South 
County. R. 1158-65. At no time did any person who claimed to have received quitclaim deeds to 
portions of these Water Rights file any challenges to the Special Master’s Reports, 
Recommendations, or Amended Recommendations to the Water Rights. Scherer, Holt and 
Fosbury did not seek to have any portion of the Water Rights decreed in their names or the name 
of their entities. 
On August 31, 2010, the SRBA Court entered an Order of Partial Decree for the Water 
Rights, decreeing the Water Rights, in their entirety, in the name of South County. R. 1167-73. 
The Partial Decrees were served on South County and included a Rule 54(b) Certification. As 
with the Special Master Recommendations, no challenges to the determination that the entirety 
of the Water Rights were owned by South County were made by Scherer, Holt or Fosbury, 
despite the fact that they were the members of the entity served with notice of the 
Recommendations and the Partial Decrees and clearly know of the SRBA proceedings. The 
Partial Decrees became final decisions and were not appealed. 
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Once MWB acquired the property and Water Rights, it submitted, on July 27, 2011, a 
Notice of Change in Water Right Ownership with IDWR, to change the Water Rights ownership 
records to reflect that MWB owned all of the Water Rights. R. 1175-82.   The Deed and 
Assignment to MWB were included.  R. 1177-82.  On September 13, 2011, IDWR notified 
MWB that the Ownership Change request has been completed and that the records for the Water 
Rights reflected that MWB owned the Water Rights, in their entirety. R. 1184.  On February 28, 
2012, Belle Ranch submitted a Notice of Change in Water Right Ownership with IDWR to 
change the Water Rights ownership records to reflect that Belle Ranch owned the entirety of the 
Water Rights. R. 1186-92. Attached to the notice filed with the IDWR were the deeds from 
GBCI and MWB.  R. 1187-92.  On March 7, 2012, IDWR notified Belle Ranch that the 
Ownership Change request had been completed and that the records for the Water Rights 
reflected that Belle Ranch owned the Water Rights, in their entirety. R. 1194. 
On or about April 2012, Belle Ranch, LLC and John Stevenson filed an Application for 
Transfer of Water Rights, seeking to amend elements of the Water Rights to create a Permissible 
Place of Use. R. 1196-97. Water from a nearby location would be transferred and used in 
conjunction with the Water Rights by Belle Ranch. R. 1196-220.  IDWR published notice of the 
pending transfer in the Idaho Mountain Express on May 16 and 23, 2012. R. 1221.  The Notice 
provided that Belle Ranch sought to transfer various water rights, including the Water Rights at 
issue in this case. Id. The Notice further provided that “any protest against the approval of this” 
transfer must be filed with IDWR “on or before June 4, 2012.” Id. No protests were filed by 
Appellants to challenge Belle Ranch’s ownership or authority to transfer any or all of the Water 
Rights. IDWR reviewed and processed the Transfer, approved the transfer as Transfer 77878 and 
amended the elements of the Water Rights in a July 6, 2012 decision. R. 1223. Significantly, the 
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Transfer stated that the “Right Holder” for the Water Rights was Belle Ranch, LLC.  Id.  
Following Transfer 77878, IDWR records continued to reflect that Belle Ranch owned the 
entirety of the Water Rights. 
On August 26, 2014, the SRBA district court issued the Final Unified Decree.5 The Final 
Unified Decree superseded all prior water rights, except as set forth in the partial decrees and 
general provisions issued by the SRBA Court. Final Unified Decree ¶ 11.  Significantly, the 
Final Unified Decree recognized administrative changes to water rights completed after the 
Partial Decree, but before the Final Unified Decree.  Id. ¶ 13.  Importantly for this appeal, only 
MWB and Belle Ranch filed Notices of Change of Ownership in that window of opportunity.  
Likewise, Belle Ranch’s Transfer 77878, which claimed all the Water Rights in the name of 
Belle Ranch, LLC, was also accomplished during this window.  None of the efforts of the 
Appellants to claim ownership based on this void quitclaims that pre-dated the Partial Decree 
were attempted until after the Final Unified Decree was issued.  See § C.5 infra.  The SRBA 
Court also issued an Order with the Final Unified Decree retaining jurisdiction over certain 
specifically enumerated pending subcases.  Id.  The Water Rights appurtenant to Belle Ranch 
Property were not among those rights retained by the SRBA Court. Id. 
5. Appellants’ Unilateral Attempts to Change of Ownership of the Water Rights 
with IDWR. 
 
IIB first asserted a claim to the Water Rights in 2014. R. 1712-15.  Counsel for Belle 
Ranch responded explaining that IIB had no valid interest.  R. 1734-37.  IIB apparently gave up, 
as nothing was heard back.  IIB then purported to transfer its interest to FSC in October 2014. R. 
156.  So FSC took whatever interest it had with full notice of the deficiencies in its claim to the 
                                                 
5 The Final Unified Decree can be publicly found here:  http://srba.idaho.gov/Images/2014-08/0039576xx09020.pdf 
(accessed 05/08/2019).  All future references to “Final Unified Decree” or “Final Decree” are citing to this public 
document.    
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Water Rights and of Belle Ranch’s ownership. 
On October 28, 2014, FSC submitted a surreptitious ownership change notice to IDWR.  
R. 1296. FSC submitted the request without providing any notice to Belle Ranch, even though 
Belle Ranch was owner of record, and even though it knew of Belle Ranch’s position. Id. IDWR 
processed the ownership change, splitting the Water Rights and creating the following new water 
rights: 37-22915, 37-22916, 37-22917, 37-22918 and 37-22919 (the “Split Water Rights). Id. On 
March 17, 2016, Belle Ranch sent a letter to IDWR challenging the ownership change, asserting 
that the SRBA Decree quieted title in the Water Rights, in their entirety, in South County– the 
owner of the Belle Ranch Property – and that Belle Ranch, had acquired all of South County’s 
interest in the Water Rights. R. 1315-64.  On March 29, 2016, IDWR sent an email to Belle 
Ranch and FSC stating that it would change the ownership of the Split Water Rights to “South 
County LLC” and that the parties could “quiet title to the water rights in district court.” R. 1366-
67. 
Thereafter the other claimants filed their own Notices.  On June 15, 2016, Defendant 
Fosbury IRA submitted a Notice of Change in Water Rights Ownership records on 2/289ths of the 
Water Rights allegedly conveyed to Fosbury IRA on March 17, 2008 and September 18, 2008. 
R. 1369-89. Fosbury IRA submitted the request without notice to Belle Ranch. Id.  On June 24, 
2016, Big Stick submitted a Notice of Change in Water Right Ownership, seeking to change the 
ownership records on 2.8/289ths of the Water Rights allegedly conveyed to Big Stick on 
December 7, 2007. R. 1392-03. Big Stick submitted the request without providing any notice to 
Belle Ranch. Id.  On June 24, 2016, Holt IRA submitted a Notice of Change in Water Right 
Ownership, seeking to change the ownership records on 2.8/289ths of the Water Rights allegedly 
conveyed to Holt IRA on August 8, 2008 and April 8, 2009. R. 1405-16. Holt IRA submitted the 
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request without providing any notice to Belle Ranch. Id.  In an email dated September 6, 2016 to 
counsel for Big Stick, Fosbury and Holt, IDWR notified them that it would not process the 
ownership change requests absent further instruction from a district court following a quiet title 
action. R. 1418.  Throughout all this time Belle Ranch continued to irrigate the Property with all 
the Water Rights and pay all the assessments. 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Pursuant to IRAP 35(b)(4), Belle Ranch submits that the issues presented in Appellants’ 
brief are insufficient and incomplete and therefore raises the following additional issues on 
appeal. 
1. Whether Appellants, as successors to South County, are estopped to claim any 
interest in the Water Rights by virtue of South County’s estoppel certificate 
acknowledging that all appurtenant water rights were transferred to MWB, when the 
entirety of the Water Rights were and remain appurtenant to the Belle Ranch Property 
and Appellants are purporting to claim their rights under South County? 
 
2. Whether Belle Ranch’s administrative transfer proceeding processed before the Final 
Unified Decree which recognized Belle Ranch LLC’s ownership of all the five Water 
Rights, and for which notice was provided as required by law, is binding on 
Appellants who claim a portion of these same water rights? 
 
3. Whether Appellants’ claims to any portion of the Water Rights are barred by the 
Statute of Limitations? 
 
4. Whether Appellants can claim ownership of water rights appurtenant to Belle Ranch 
Property when they have never beneficially used, banked or transferred those rights to 
another property? 
 
III. ATTORNEY’S FEES ON APPEAL 
In conformance with I.A.R. 35(b)(5), Respondents herein request an award of their 
attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to I.C. § 12-121, I.A.R. 40 and 41 and any other applicable 
provisions of Idaho law. 
/// 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
When this Court reviews a district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment it 
employs the same standard properly employed by the district court when originally ruling on the 
motion. Cherry v. Coregis Ins. Co., 146 Idaho 882, 884, 204 P.3d 522, 524 (2009) (citing 
Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Talbot, 133 Idaho 428, 431, 987 P.2d 1043, 1046 (1999). Summary 
judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the only remaining 
questions are questions of law. Id. (citing Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 677, 39 P.3d 612, 
617 (2001)). This Court liberally construes all disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party and 
draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the record in favor of the party 
opposing the motion. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793, 
134 P.3d 641, 644 (2006).  The fact that cross-motions have been filed does not change the 
standard of review.  Each party’s motion is evaluated on its own merits.  Petrus Family Trust v. 
Kirk, 163 Idaho 490, 494, 415 P. 3d 358, 362 (2018). 
The nonmoving party cannot rest upon mere speculation and must submit more than just 
conclusory assertions that an issue of material fact exists to withstand summary judgment. 
Cantwell v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 133, 191 P.3d 205, 211 (2008). A nonmoving party 
must come forward with evidence by way of affidavit, or otherwise, that contradicts the evidence 
submitted by the moving party and establishes the existence of a material issue of disputed fact. 
Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 225, 228, 159 P.3d 862, 865 (2007) (citations omitted). The 
nonmoving defendant has the burden of supporting a claimed affirmative defense on a motion for 
summary judgment. Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 771, 215 P.3d 485, 491 (2009). A mere 
scintilla of evidence, or only slight doubt as to the facts, is not sufficient to create a genuine issue 
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of material fact. Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 897, 155 P.3d 695, 698 (2007) (citations 
omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate where the nonmoving party bearing the burden of 
proof fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the 
party’s case. Cantwell, 146 Idaho at 133, 191 P.3d at 211. In the absence of genuine disputed 
issues of material fact, only questions of law remain and the Court exercises free review. Stuard 
v. Jorgenson, 150 Idaho 701, 704, 249 P. 3d 1156, 1159 (2011). 
When an action will be tried before a court without a jury, the court is not constrained to 
draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary judgment, but is free to 
arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts. Barnes 
v. Jackson, 163 Idaho 194, 198, 408 P.3d 1266, 1270 (2018); Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 
434, 437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991) (citing Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 650 
P.2d 657 (1982)). 
   “[I]t is well-settled that where an order of a lower court is correct, but based on an 
erroneous theory, the order will be affirmed upon the correct theory. Grabicki v. City of 
Lewiston, 154 Idaho 686, 692, 302 P.3d 26, 32 (2013) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). The Court will uphold the decision of a trial court if any alternative legal basis can be 
found to support it.  Daleiden v. Jefferson Cnty. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 251, 139 Idaho 466, 470–
471, 80 P.3d 1067, 1071–1072 (2003).” Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep't of Admin., 159 
Idaho 813, 827, 367 P.3d 208, 222 (2016); see also Hauser Lake Rod and Gun Club, Inc. v. City 
of Hauser, 162 Idaho 260, 396 P.3d 689 (2017). 
B. Introduction 
 The district court initially reviewed the evidence relating to the various attempts by the 
manager/members South County to strip out parts of the water rights from the LLC for their 
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personal use and concluded that those efforts were ineffectual; with the possible exception of the 
earliest such effort by Big Stick involving a 2.8/289ths interest in the water rights. R. 1755-64. 
Upon Appellants’ Motion for Reconsideration and in light of Eden case the district court 
concluded that its initial ruling on the basis of the recorded documents was correct, but that 
Appellants were precluded by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata from asserting 
any ownership interests in the Water Rights.  R. 1919-34.  Thus, it concluded that Belle Ranch 
owned the entirety of the Water Rights.  Both conclusions are correct. 
 Appellants devote most of their argument to res judicata and collateral estoppel grounds, 
and so Belle Ranch will begin its response with these issues.  In reviewing Appellants’ 
arguments, this Court must bear in mind that Appellants’ claims all derived from purported 
assignments from South County.  As successors to South County, Appellants are in privity with 
South County and bound to the same extent as South County.  In other words, Appellants stand 
in the same shoes as South County and, if South County could not make the arguments 
Appellants are making then neither can Appellants.  Silver Eagle Mining Co. v. State, 153 Idaho 
176, 179, 280 P. 3d 679, 682 (2012).  Not only as successors are Appellants in privity with South 
County, the members-owners of South County when they attempted to strip some of the water 
from South County must be charged to the same degree as South County with its actions and 
inactions.  These members-owners allowed a partial decree to be entered in favor of South 
County for the Water Rights and did nothing about it for over six years.   
C. The District Court’s Order Granting Belle Ranch’s Motion for Summary Judgment 
Should be Affirmed Because The SRBA Quieted Title and Adjudicated Ownership 
in the Water Rights and Appellants’ Claims are Barred by Collateral Estoppel.  
 
The district court examined the SRBA and administrative proceedings with respect to 
these five water rights and correctly concluded that the rights were partially decreed to South 
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County in 2010, and that MWB and Belle Ranch filed change of ownership and transfer 
proceedings, as required by Idaho law, before the Final Unified Decree was issued in 2014.  It 
was not until after the Final Unified Decree was issued that Appellants tried to go behind the 
Partial Decree, the administrative proceedings and the Final Unified Decree to assert their 
current claims.  Accordingly, the district court properly held Appellants were barred by res 
judicata and collateral estoppel.  The court correctly held there was a unity of parties, the same 
claim to water rights and a final judgment on the merits.  R.1919 -34. 
Appellants admit that their current claim of ownership is inconsistent with South 
County’s Partial Decree and admit that they derive their claims from purported conveyances 
from South County preceding the Partial and Final Decrees.  They do not challenge the 
conclusion that they are in privity with the parties or that there was a final judgment.  Rather, 
they argue that they are not bound by the decree, contending that “ownership of these Water 
Rights was never litigated in the SRBA.” Opening Brief on Appeal p. 23. They also argue that 
ownership “was not required to be litigated” Id. p. 24.   
Significantly, Appellants do not assert that ownership of a water right could not be 
brought in the SRBA.  Indeed, they explain that, had their ownership claims been asserted, the 
SRBA Court would have recognized the quitclaims to their “predecessors”6. Id. p. 30. Appellants 
even concede that the SRBA Court and this Court on appeal from SRBA decisions have made 
decisions about water right ownership.  Id. p. 24.n.16. 
In United States v. Pioneer Irr. Dist., 144 Idaho 106, 108, 157 P. 3d 600, 602 (2007) this 
Court stated: “This is a water rights case arising from the Snake River Basin Adjudication 
(SRBA) regarding ownership interests of the United States and various irrigation entities.”  
                                                 
6 This contention is incorrect, because, as the district court correctly ruled, these quitclaims were void and 
ineffective to transfer any title. 
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(emphasis added).  There the Court fashioned a remark for the reservoir water rights describing 
the ownership interests of the United States, the irrigation organizations and the consumers or 
users of water.  Id at 115, 157 P. 3d at 607.  Quite clearly the SRBA and this Court could and did 
rule on ownership.  Judge Wildman, who presides over the SRBA, held that the SRBA court had 
jurisdiction to adjudicate water right ownership interests. Cash v. Cash, Case No. CV-2016-02 
(Camas County) Order Denying Petitioner’s Second Motion for Reconsideration. (Jan. 12, 
2018). (“Cash”) Copy attached as Exhibit C; see also R. 1813.  Judge Wildman extensively 
catalogued many of the ownership cases decided in the SRBA.7  He concluded that to accept 
FSC’s argument “would get a dangerous precedent wherein individuals could dispute ownership 
of a water right indefinitely into the future based on pre-decree factors…”  Id. p. 7.  FSC’s 
counsel must be convinced as he cited Cash to this Court. 8 
The fact that ownership could be and has been litigated in front of the SRBA is 
significant for res judicata purposes.  Appellants’ brief at p. 23 quotes from Black Canyon Irr. 
Dist. v. State, 163 Idaho 144, 150, 408 P. 3d 899, 905 (2018).  That quote includes the following 
statement: “Under this doctrine, a claim is also precluded if it could have been brought in the 
previous action, regardless of whether it was actually brought…”(emphasis added).  Had 
Appellants or their predecessors wished to claim ownership to the water rights they assert were 
quitclaimed to them before the Partial and Final decrees, they “could have” done so by filing an 
objection but did not.  See Cash supra.  In Black Canyon, this Court held that Black Canyon 
                                                 
7 These decisions included this Court’s decisions in Joyce Livestock v. U.S., 144 Idaho 1, 156 P. 3d 502 (2007); 
Bedke v. City of Oakley, 149 Idaho 532, 237 P. 3d 1 (2010); and Fort Hall Water Users Ass’n v. US, 129 Idaho 39, 
921 P. 2d 739 (1996), and many other district court decisions. 
8 Appellants’ attorney cited the Cash decision to this Court, and relied upon Judge Wildman’s authority stating, “the 
fact must not be lost that Judge Wildman, since 2009, has been the presiding judge of the SRBA; and, from 1999 
until his appointment to the bench in 2009, Judge Wildman was the staff attorney for the SRBA…Clearly, Judge 
Wildman has experience and insight into the laws governing the adjudication, making his views persuasive.” 
Respondent’s Brief, p. 30, Supreme Court No. 45675. 
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Irrigation District was precluded based on the United States’ prior claims to the water rights in 
the adjudication because the Irrigation District’s claims were “derived from” the United States’ 
water rights thus satisfying the unity of parties requirement.  163 Idaho at 152, 408 P. 3d at 907. 
The SRBA was a general stream adjudication—precisely to determine the elements of the 
water rights, and ownership thereof. If Appellants had any claims or interest in these Water 
Rights, they were required to make their claims in the SRBA. There is no doubt they are 
“claimants” to Water Rights included in the adjudication.  They failed to participate, even though 
they had actual knowledge of the SRBA proceedings, and are now attempting to collaterally 
attack the Partial and Final Decrees.  
Pertinent portions of I.C. § 42-1409 state as follows:  
(4)  All claimants of water rights that are included in a general adjudication shall 
file with the director a notice of claim for all water rights, except for those types of 
water rights designated in paragraphs (a) through (d) of subsection (1) of section 
42-1420, Idaho Code. 
 
(5)  Any person who fails to submit a required notice of claim shall be deemed to 
have been constructively served with notice of a general adjudication by publication 
and mailing as required by section 42-1408, Idaho Code. 
 
(6)  Each purchaser of a water right from the water system shall inquire of the 
director whether a notice of claim has been filed, and if not, shall file a notice of 
claim in accordance with this section. All claimants and purchasers shall provide 
the director written notice of any change in ownership or of any change in mailing 
address during the pendency of a general adjudication. All purchasers shall submit 
some evidence of ownership along with the notice of change of ownership. 
 
I.C. 42-1409(4)-(6) (emphasis added).  
Appellants cannot overcome the binding nature of the SRBA Partial and Final Decrees.  
The Decree entered in a general adjudication is “conclusive as to the nature and extent of all 
water rights in the adjudicated water system”.  I.C. § 42-1420(1).  See also State v. Nelson, 131 
Idaho 12, 16, 951 P.2d 943, 947 (1998)(“Finality in water rights is essential.”). I.C. § 42-1420(1) 
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even goes as far as to state that unless the water right fits within specific exceptions as therein 
listed, the water right is lost by failure to file a notice of claim.  
I.C. §§ 42-1411(2) and 42-1412(6) provide that a partial decree must list the “name and 
address of the claimant” of the water rights being adjudicated. A “claimant” is defined as “any 
person asserting ownership of rights to the use of water within the state of Idaho.” I.C. § 42-
1401A(1). The decree unequivocally links the claimant to ownership of the water right.  
Appellants’ attempt to contend that claimant does not mean owner cannot withstand this 
statutory definition or the fact that ownership as among claimants has been decided in SRBA 
proceedings.  
In Mullinix v. Killgore's Salmon River Fruit Co., 158 Idaho 269, 277–78, 346 P.3d 286, 
294–95 (2015), this Court stated:  
Killgore’s argument contesting the existence of a water right on the Killgore-
Mullinix parcel is foreclosed by virtue of James’s Joe Creek water right no. 79-
4001 and the SRBA partial decrees. In a contested water rights case, this Court 
held that a water rights decree was “conclusive proof of diversion of the water, 
and of application of the water to beneficial use, i.e., the decree is res judicata as 
to the water rights at issue herein.” Crow, 107 Idaho at 465, 690 P.2d at 920.  
 
and continued:  
Our holding of the presumption of accuracy of the decree is in keeping with the 
judicial policy of deterring the reopening of judgment long after cases are decided 
and the files are closed. Our holding is also consistent with the ruling of the trial 
judge, in which he stated that a decree affixing water rights and establishing 
priorities is bidding on all parties, and that such decree fixes the dates of priority 
and the land to which the water is appropriated. 
 
(emphasis in original). The Final Unified Decree, provides that all persons are bound. See Final 
Unified Decree; See also Order Re: Proposed Final Unified Decree and Adoption Proposed 
Procedures and Deadlines, In re SRBA Case No. 39576, Subcase No. 00-92099 (Jan. 30, 2012).  
In 2010, the SRBA court entered a Partial Decree for all the Water Rights at issue in this 
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case (including the portion of the rights held by Belle Ranch which are not challenged by 
Appellants) in the name of South County. R. 1167-73.  In 2011 and 2012, prior to the 2014 Final 
Unified Decree, MWB and Belle Ranch both took the required procedural administrative steps to 
change the water right ownership of these rights into their respective names. R. 1175-82, 1186-
92.  Belle Ranch also filed an administrative transfer proceeding unambiguously asserting 
ownership to all the Water Rights in the name of Belle Ranch. R. 1196-21.  Before the Final 
Unified Decree Appellants did not make any claim of ownership to IDWR or the SRBA court.   
Appellants assert that their status as “claimants” to these Water Rights pre-dated the 2010 
Partial Decree. However, they and their predecessors did not move to alter or amend the notice 
of claims or the Partial Decree to have the SRBA court recognize their purported interests. I.C. § 
42-1409A (2) authorizes amendment of the name of the claimant “at any time”. The SRBA Court 
issued a deadline order requiring late claims to be filed by January 13, 2013. In Re SRBA Case 
No. 39576, Subcase No. 37-00864, 164 Idaho 241, 429 P.3d 129 (2008). (“Eden”).  Appellants 
did nothing. Furthermore, I.C. § 42-1409(6) requires that each claimant and purchaser of a water 
right “shall” inquire of the director whether a notice of claim has been filed, and if not, “shall” 
file a notice of claim, “shall” provide a written notice of change in ownership and submit 
evidence of ownership during the pendency of a general adjudication. “Shall” means mandatory.  
Simpson v. Louisiana Pacific Corp. 134 Idaho 209, 213, 998 P.2d 1122, 1126 (2000) 
(legislature’s use of “shall” establishes a mandatory requirement); Roesch v. Klemann, 155 Idaho 
175, 178 307 P.3d 192, 195 (2014) (same).  Appellants did not follow these mandatory SRBA 
procedures for the general adjudication, and are attempting to excuse their failures by filing this 
untimely collateral attack.  
In Eden, claimants sought to set aside the Partial and Final Decrees to assert ownership to 
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a right that had been decreed as disallowed.  Similarly, Appellants assert a claim to a previously 
decreed water right and in effect seek to set-aside the Partial Decree and the Final Unified 
Decree to name themselves as owners. As this Court held in Eden, “after a 27-year effort the 
SRBA Court issued the Final Unified Decree that is ‘conclusive as to the nature and extent of all 
water rights within the Snake River Basin within the State of Idaho with a priority date prior to 
November 19, 1987” and is “binding against all persons.” Id.at 245, 429 P.3d at 133 (quoting 
Final Unified Decree). “All persons” includes Appellants.  
Appellants would have this Court overlook the mandatory provisions of I.C. 42-1409(6) 
by asserting that IDWR does not make ownership decisions.  The problem with this argument is 
that it ignores the fact that 42-1409(6) is part of the adjudication statutes.  “The notice 
requirements specific to the SRBA are set forth by statute.” Id. at 249, 429 P.3d at 137. 
Appellants argue that the statutory adjudication procedures do not apply to them, and they are 
free to assert ownership of decreed water rights, based on pre-decree transactions, at any time. 
The adjudication statutes and Eden make it clear that all claimants are bound to follow the SRBA 
statutory procedures. See Holden v. Werce, 162 Idaho 393, 414 P. 3d 215 (2018)(requiring the 
parties to follow the established adjudication procedures or forfeit their claims).   
This Court “has long accepted that water rights adjudications present unique 
circumstances often requiring a departure from established rules of procedure.” Eden, supra, 164 
Idaho at 251, 429 P.3d at 139.  The adjudication procedures are clearly set forth by statute. I.C. § 
42-1409A authorizes a claimant to amend its notice of a claim. Under I.C. § 42-1401A(1), a 
“claimant” is “any person asserting ownership of rights to the use of water…” Obviously that 
definition includes Appellants. I.C. § 42-1409 establishes a procedure for filing claims in the 
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SRBA. Thus, “any person asserting ownership of rights use of water” must provide a notice of 
claim with the Director. I.C. § 42-1409(1)(a).  
The SRBA is “conclusive” as to the nature of the water rights and “[a]ll prior rights that 
were required to be claimed in the SRBA were superseded by the Final Unified Decree.” Eden, 
164 Idaho at 253, 429 P.3d at 141 (2018). This Court’s holding in Eden makes clear that this 
“conclusive” decision applies to claims of ownership of water rights.  Judge Wildman in Cash v. 
Cash, Camas County, Case No. CV-2016-02, Order Denying Petitioners Second Motion for 
Reconsideration, pp. 6-7 (January 12, 2018) held that the Final Unified Decree is conclusive as 
to the nature and extent of all water rights in the SRBA and “[t]his includes all the defining 
elements of a water right, including the key defining element of ownership.” R. 1813-22; Exhibit 
C.  
When the SRBA court adjudicated the Water Rights to South County, it adjudicated the 
Water Rights against all other claimants who could have asserted competing claims at the time, 
including Appellants.  As Appellants are claiming their rights under and pursuant to the rights 
previously held by South County then, if South County had no rights, then Appellants have no 
rights either. “[I]f a court has the general power to adjudicate the issues in the class of suits to 
which the case belongs its interim orders and final judgments, whether right or wrong, are not 
subject to collateral attack, so far as jurisdiction over the subject matter is concerned.” Gordon v. 
Gordon, 118 Idaho 804, 807, 800 P.2d 1018, 1021 (1990) (emphasis in original). See also 
Rangen v. IDWR, 159 Idaho 796, 367 P. 3d 193 (2016) (impermissible collateral attack on 
decree).  The SRBA court had the statutory authority and jurisdiction to adjudicate water rights 
“against other water users,” and did exactly that, finding that the Water Rights belonged to South 
County and not to Appellants. The SRBA court’s determination may not be challenged now. 
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D. The District Court’s Order Granting Belle Ranch’s Motion for Summary Judgment 
Should be Affirmed Because Belle Ranch and MWB followed the Requirements of 
Idaho Code §§ 42-1409(a) and 42-248 Prior to Issuance of the Final Decree—and 
Appellants did not. 
 
After ownership of the Water Rights was adjudicated to South County, both MWB and 
Belle Ranch did exactly what they were required to do under the mandatory statutory 
adjudication procedures to document the transfer of ownership of the Water Rights to Belle 
Ranch. I.C. §§ 42-428, 42-1409(6).  Belle Ranch purchased the Property and Water Rights from 
MWB and GCBI who had acquired the Property and appurtenant Water Rights from South 
County.  Belle Ranch and MWB both filed Notices of Change of Ownership.  R. 1175 and R. 
1186. Thereafter, Belle Ranch also filed a Transfer Application under I.C. § 42-222, asserting 
ownership to all 289 acres of the Water Rights in the name of Belle Ranch appurtenant to the 
Belle Ranch Property. R. 1196 and R. 1223. Appellants did nothing during the adjudication.  No 
notices of change of ownership or transfer applications were filed prior to the Final Unified 
Decree. 
Appellants would have this Court believe that Belle Ranch is arguing that every Notice of 
Change of Ownership is binding on the world.  Not so.  Rather, I.C. § 42-1409(6) makes it 
mandatory to provide notice to the Director during the course of an adjudication, then those 
persons acting as required by law who file the required notice with IDWR are entitled to 
protection of the adjudication and Final Unified Decree.  Those who don’t are precluded.  Belle 
Ranch filed the required notice. Appellants’ failure to take action prior to the Final Unified 
Decree is fatal to Appellants’ claims.  
E. The District Court’s Order Granting Belle Ranch’s Motion for Summary Judgment 
Should be Affirmed Because Belle Ranch’s Transfer Proceedings of the Water 
Rights through IDWR Acts as Res Judicata and Binding as to Appellants’ Claims.  
 
Appellants had proper notice and a more than adequate number of opportunities to 
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contest, object, or make a claim to some portion of the Water Rights, but they simply did not. 
The administrative transfer proceedings before IDWR provided another opportunity to raise their 
claims to the Water Rights, which they also ignored. It too is binding and acts as res judicata 
upon Appellants’ claims.  
The “doctrine of res judicata covers both claim preclusion (true res judicata) and issue 
preclusion (collateral estoppel).” Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 613, 
617 (2007). “Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same 
claim or upon claims ‘related to the same cause of action…which might have been made.’” Id. 
Issue preclusion protects litigants from litigating an identical issue with the same party or its 
privity. Id. (internal citations omitted). Fundamentally: (1) it preserves the acceptability of 
judicial dispute resolution against the corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same matter 
were twice litigated to inconsistent results; (2) it serves the public interest in protecting the courts 
against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and (3) it advances the private interest in repose 
from the harassment of repetitive claims. Id. See also Black Canyon Irr. Dist. v. State, 163 Idaho 
144, 408 P. 3d 899 (2018). 
A water right transfer results in a permanent or long-term change to a water right's point 
of diversion or a change to the place of use, period of use, and/or nature of use and ownership. 
I.C. § 42-222; R. 1196. Appellants claim that ownership change cannot, as a matter of law, be 
included in a transfer.  Appellants are wrong as a matter of statutory construction.  Contrary to 
Appellants’ assertions, I.C. § 42-248(4) specifically provides that change of ownership can be 
accomplished under a Section 42-222 transfer proceeding.  The law could not be more clear.  In 
order to accomplish the transfer, a person has to be entitled to the use of the water right by 
license, claims or decree, and has to make application with IDWR describing the water rights 
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ownership and the requested transfer so the department can hold an administrative proceeding 
and the public has an opportunity to protest the same. Id.  
Res judicata applies to agency decisions. Astorie Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Solimino, 
501 U.S. 104, 107-08, 111 S. Ct. 2166, 2169 (1991)(“We have long favored application of the 
common-law doctrines of collateral estoppel (as to issues) and res judicata (as to claims) to those 
determinations of administrative bodies that have attained finality.”);  Magee v. Thompson Creek 
Mining Co., 152 Idaho 196, 268 P.3d 464 (2012); Welch v. Del Monte Corp., 128 Idaho 513, 915 
P.2d 1371 (1976). In Idaho, “the doctrine of res judicata means that ‘in action between the same 
parties upon the same claim or demand, the former adjudication concludes parties and privities 
not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim but also every 
matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit.’” Magee, 152 Idaho at 202, 
268 P.3d at 470 (quoting Farmers Nat’l Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 70, 87 P.2d 762, 769 
(1994). This Court has held that a prior IDWR administrative proceeding precludes re-litigation 
of issues before the Department.  Branson v. Higginson, 128 Idaho 274, 275, 1912 P.2d 642, 643 
(1996).  Objectors to a transfer application must follow IDAPA judicial review requirements. 
Chisholm v. IDWR, 142 Idaho 159, 161, 125 P.3d 515, 517 (2015).  Appellants did not 
participate or file an appeal. 
This Court faced a similar situation in Hillcrest Irr. Dist. v. Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist., 
57 Idaho 403, 66 P.2d 115 (1937).  There, Hillcrest Irrigation District had submitted the 
equivalent of a transfer application to the state engineer (now IDWR).  The transfer was 
approved and not appealed.  Id. Thereafter Hillcrest put the water to beneficial used after 
obtaining approval of the transfer.  Id.  Years later, Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. challenged the 
validity of the transfer.  This Court stated: 
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Long and continuous knowing acquiescence in another’s use and enjoyment of a property 
or privilege may preclude one from subsequently asserting a claim. 
 
In Ryan v. Wooding, 9 Idaho, 525, 75 P. 261 the just and fair rule is stated as follows: 
“[c]ourts of equity do not favor antiquated or stale demands and refuse to interfere when 
there has been gross laches in commencing the proper action, or long acquiescence in the 
assertion of adverse rights.” 
 
Id. at 411. 
 This Court held that Hillcrest had used the water after the transfer and that title to the 
water should be quieted in Hillcrest’s name.  Id. at 412.  In Hillcrest the adverse use of the water 
following the transfer was twenty years.  Here the adverse use has been since the 2011 irrigation 
season and then 2012 transfer.  Appellants do not explain why five irrigation seasons adverse use 
following a transfer where they sat idly on their rights, is not sufficient.  Compare I.C. § 42-
222(2) (all rights are lost or forfeited for five years of non-use). 
All of Appellants’ claims derive from South County’s prior interest in the Water Rights.  
After Belle Ranch acquired the Belle Ranch Property and appurtenant Water Rights, it filed for 
an administrative transfer of those water rights with IDWR. R. 1196-1221. Legal notice of the 
application was prepared and published in the Idaho Mountain Express on May 16, and 23, 2017. 
Id. The Notice provided that Belle Ranch sought to transfer various water rights, including all the 
Water Rights at issue in this case. Id. The Notice further provided that “any protest against the 
approval of this” transfer must be filed with IDWR “on or before June 4, 2012.” Id. South 
County and its members had the opportunity to contest the transfer.  They failed to do so. No 
protests were received to challenge Belle Ranch, LLC’s authority to transfer the entirety of the 
Water Rights. IDWR reviewed and processed the Transfer, and then issued a final decision 
approving the transfer and amending the elements of the Water Rights in a July 6, 2012 decision. 
R. 1223. No one appealed.  The order is final and precludes Appellants’ claims. 
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The transfer proceedings occurred after the Partial Decrees, but prior to the Final Unified 
Decree. The court order approving that Decree states that, “the Final Unified Decree does not 
supersede the results of water right transfers initiated and completed after the entry of a partial 
decree but prior to entry of the Final Unified Decree.” Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Challenge in the Matter of the Final Unified Decree, (June 28, 2012) at p. 7 (emphasis added)9 
see also Final Unified Decree, supra, at p. 12, ¶ 13(1).  Appellants agree that transfers that took 
place prior to the Final Decree and after the Partial Decree are valid.  Therefore, based upon the 
administrative transfer proceedings, preserved by the Final Unified Decree, Appellants’ claims 
are barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.  
F. The District Court’s Order Granting Belle Ranch’s Motion for Summary Judgment 
Should be Affirmed Because Belle Ranch’s Ownership was Preserved under the 
Final Unified Decree as an Administrative Change. 
 
Appellants argue that even if they are precluded, the Court should decree the 15.3/289ths 
interest in the rights to South County (a defunct entity) as owner since the Partial Decree was in 
the name of South County, and Belle Ranch’s ownership suffers the same fate as Appellants. 
This is wrong. “This Final Unified Decree shall not be construed to supersede or affect…. any 
administrative changes to the elements of a water right after entry of a partial decree, but prior to 
the entry of this Final Unified Decree” Final Unified Decree, surpa p. 12 ¶ 13(emphasis added), 
Memorandum Decision, and Order on Challenge in the Matter of the Final Unified Decree, 
supra, pp. 7, 18. Thus, any administrative proceedings after the Partial Decree and before the 
Final Decree are preserved.  
The Final Unified Decree is also clear that the term “administrative changes” is 
                                                 
9 http://srba.idaho.gov/Images/2012-06/0092099xx00199.pdf (accessed 05/09/2019) 
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intentionally broad. The breadth of the Final Unified Decree is supported by the SRBA briefs on 
this very issue showing that the SRBA court broadened “transfer” to include “any administrative 
changes.”10 Specifically, in these briefs, “transfers” was given as one example of an 
administrative proceeding. Id.  Likewise, the participating parties did not object to the SRBA 
court’s decision to preserve “any administrative changes” post partial decree as opposed to 
simply referencing to transfers.11 
Moreover, there is a fundamental difference between Appellants’ claims to ownership 
and Belle Ranch’s claims to ownership. Appellants base their claims to ownership solely on 
South County transactions that allegedly occurred prior to the entry of both the Partial Decree 
and Final Unified Decree. Appellants did not attempt any administrative steps until after the 
Final Unified Decree. Belle Ranch, on the other hand, complied with I.C. §§ 42-1409(6) and 42-
248(4).  Appellants did not.  Belle Ranch bases its claims of ownership on facts, transactions and 
following the appropriate administrative procedural steps prior to the Final Unified Decree. 
Belle Ranch followed the legislature’s directions. Belle Ranch’s ownership was documented 
through IDWR’s administrative proceedings, before the Final Unified Decree and Belle Ranch 




                                                 
10 See Sinclair Oil Corporation’s Notice of Challenge (filed February 16, 2012); see also Opening Brief in Support 
of Notice of Challenge (filed April 3, 2012). These cases and briefs filed in opposition, support and response to the 
Final Unified Decree are all publicly available under SRBA Subcase No. 00-92099, which can be found online at: 
http://www.srba.state.id.us/SREPT.HTM 
11 See State of Idaho’s Memorandum in Response to Briefs in Support of Notices of Challenge to Order re: Proposed 
Final Unified Decree and Adopting Proposed Procedures and Deadlines, pp. 4-5 (lodged May 9, 2012); Ground 
Water Districts’ Rebuttal Brief on Notice of Challenge, at p. 2 (lodged May 9, 2012); Pocatello’s Rebuttal Brief on 
Challenge, at p. 2, (lodged May 9, 2012). Available publicly under the aforementioned SRBA Subcase.   
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G. The District Court’s Order Granting Belle Ranch’s Motion for Summary Judgment 
Should be Affirmed Because All of Appellants’ Claims are Void, Except for the 
2.8/289ths Claim by Big Stick LLC. 
 
The District Court held that FSC’s claims to the 7.5/289ths of the water right were 
invalid, because its right was derivative of IIB, which never had title to convey, and both had 
record notice of MWB’s second and third mortgages. R. 1755-65. As to the other 7.8/289ths 
Fosbury claims, the District Court found that 5/289ths are invalid for the same reasons as FSC’s 
7.5/289ths claims. Id.  Title never passed.  As to the remaining 2.8/289th interests alleged by Big 
Stick, the district court found that Big Stick’s quitclaim was recorded prior to MWB’s second 
and third mortgages and therefore was not facially for summary judgment purposes.  
Belle Ranch is the record owner of the Belle Ranch Property and the 289/289ths interest in 
the appurtenant Water Rights. Idaho law presumes that the record holder of title to property is 
the legal owner. Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264, 270, 127 P.3d 167, 173 (2005) (citing Hettinga 
v. Sybrandy, 126 Idaho 467, 469, 886 P.2d 772, 774 (1994); Russ Ballard & Family Achievement 
Inst. v. Lava Hot Springs Resort, Inc., 97 Idaho 572, 579, 548 P.2d 72, 79 (1976)). “[O]ne who 
would claim the ownership of property of which the legal title stands of record in another ... must 
establish such claim by evidence that is clear, satisfactory and convincing.” Id. (quoting Russ 
Ballard & Family Achievement Inst., 97 Idaho at 579, 548 P.2d at 79).  
Appellants’ claims are invalid because Appellants’ cannot reconcile their interests with 
I.C. § 55-812, which states in pertinent part:  
[e]very conveyance of real property… is void as against any subsequent purchaser or 
mortgagee of the same property, or any part thereof, in good faith and for a valuable 
consideration, whose conveyance is first duly recorded.  
 
(emphasis added).  
There is no dispute of fact.  All the quitclaims, except the one to Big Stick, were recorded 
-
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after the 2008 second and third mortgages.  Based upon the timing of execution and recording of 
the underlying quitclaim deeds, I.C. § 55-812 renders all the purported quitclaim deeds from 
South County void as against the subsequent purchaser or mortgagee.  That clearly means MWB 
and its successor, Belle Ranch. Under I.C. § 55-813 a conveyance “embraces every instrument in 
writing by which any estate or interest in real property is created, alienated, mortgaged or 
encumbered, or by which the title to any real property may be affected,” which includes deeds to 
water. Idaho’s race-notice recording statute voids a prior conveyance when (1) a subsequent 
conveyance was made in good faith and for valuable consideration and (2) the subsequent 
conveyance is the first duly recorded.  Insight LLC v. Gunter, 154 Idaho 779, 787, 302 P.3d 
1052, 1060 (2013). Here there is no dispute that the second the third mortgages were in good 
faith.  The South County Estoppel Certificate is more than adequate proof of that fact.  Nor is 
there any dispute that the mortgages were recorded before the quitclaims. 
The use of “void” in the statute versus voidable has important legal consequences. “A 
void thing is as no thing,” whereas something that is voidable can be ratified and although can be 
declared void, is not void in itself. Yvanova v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 62 Cal. 4th 919, 929–
30, 365 P.3d 845, 852 (2016); see also Rogers v. Household Life Ins. Co., 150 Idaho 735, 738, 
250 P.3d 786, 789 (2011) (discussing the difference between void and voidable contract for 
incapacitated persons). Indeed, in Rogers, the court held that it was bound by the Legislature’s 
use of the word “void” in I.C. § 32-108. Rogers, 150 Idaho at 739, 250 P.3d at 790. “Void 
contracts are deemed to have never existed in the eyes of the law.” Syringa Networks LLC v. 
Idaho Department of Administration, 159 Idaho 813, 827, 367 P.3d 208, 222 (2016); see also 
Drug Testing Compliance Grp., LLC v. DOT Compliance Serv., 161 Idaho 93, 100-01, 383 P.3d 
1263, 1270-71 (2016) (a void contract “is not a promise at all; it is the promise of something that 
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is void of legal effect”). 
South County’s purported quitclaim conveyances to its members were not merely 
voidable, but were void as against the mortgagee (MWB) and successor in interest (Belle Ranch). 
The District Court was correct in holding Appellant FSC’s 7.5/289ths and 5/289ths of Appellant 
Fosbury’s claim as invalid or void.  
Appellants argue that MWB’s second and third mortgages did not convey title to MWB.  
Appellants must be confused.  The Deed in Lieu conveyed title.  Title included all the Water 
Rights because the quitclaim deeds that Appellants rely upon were void as to MWB, they are 
likewise void against Belle Ranch.  
Appellants also argue whether the Deed in Lieu was a proper “foreclosure” and assert 
that the IIB liens somehow survived the Deed in Lieu.  It should be clear to this Court that the 
IIB liens attached only to the property purportedly conveyed by the quitclaim deeds. Since the 
quitclaims are “void,” they have no legal effect on the Water Rights.  There is nothing for IIB’s 
lien to attach to. 
H. The District Court’s Order Granting Belle Ranch’s Motion for Summary Judgment 
Should be Affirmed Because Appellants’ Quiet Title Actions are Barred by the 
Applicable Statute of Limitations. (I.C. § 5-224).  
 
The district court initially concluded that there were questions of fact over whether the 
statute of limitations had run on Appellants’ claims to the Water Rights.  R. 1919-34.  However, 
in its Memorandum Decision on Motion for Reconsideration of Summary Judgment the court 
stated that, “[i]t appears that the statute of limitations has run as against those making claims 
against Belle Ranch…However, this issue is not necessary to this decision.”  Id. at 1932. The 
District court was correct. Appellants’ later actions and administrative filings with IDWR cannot 
extend the statute of limitations or when Appellants’ claims accrued.   When the district court’s 
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decision can be affirmed on any ground, this Court will affirm.  Syringa Networks LLC v. Idaho 
Dept. of Administration, 159 Idaho 813, 827, 367 P.3d 208, 222 (2016). 
Thus, Appellants’ quiet title claims are also barred by application of the four year (4) 
statute of limitations. I.C. § 5-224; § 6-401. This includes any claim for water right ownership. 
Brown v. Greenheart, 157 Idaho 156, 162, 335 P. 3d 1,7 (2014).  In Brown v. Greenheart, this 
Court addressed the accrual and the statute of limitations relating to claims to water rights. This 
Court held that a cause of action to quiet title to water rights, pursuant to I.C. § 5-224 and § 6-
401, accrues when another person claims an interest in the property (or water right) “adverse to” 
another. Id.  “[W]here discovery of a cause of action commences the statute of limitations the 
date of discovery is a fact question for the jury unless there is no evidence creating a question of 
fact.” Id. (quoting McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 773, 820 P.2d 360, 368 (1991)).  Thus, when 
the facts are undisputed with respect to the dates when the other party asserts an adverse interest, 
summary judgment on the statute of limitations is proper. 
FSC waited until December 2, 2016, and Big Stick, Fosbury and Holt waited until 
December 28, 2016, to file their quiet title actions, R. 14; R. 39. Here, the undisputed facts make 
clear that Appellants were put on notice of adverse claims, many times over, more than 4-years 
prior to filing the quiet title actions. Thus, Appellants’ claims are time-barred under I.C. § 5-224.   
Appellants argued that, because the 2010 SRBA Partial Decrees identified South County 
as the owner of the water rights, there was no adverse claim. Appellants do not claim they had no 
notice of the acts of the SRBA Court.  Nor could they.  If they are claiming to own the water 
rights, the issuance of a decree in the name of another entity is clearly an adverse claim. They did 
nothing to correct that partial decree issued in the name of another party for over six years. 
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Appellants argue that the partial releases had the effect of perfecting their inchoate right 
in the water rights. The partial releases were all executed by October 2009, and recorded by 
February 2010. R. 1420-42, 1478-79.  On June 28, 2010, after the execution and recordation of 
the documents Appellants rely on for their claims, the SRBA Court issued a Recommendation 
that the Water Rights be decreed, in their entirety, to South County. R. 1149-56. On July 9, 2010, 
the SRBA Court issued an Amended Recommendation, confirming the recommendation that 
each of the Water Rights be decreed, in their entirety, to South County. R. 1158-65. Ultimately, 
on August 31, 2010, the SRBA Court entered Partial Decrees, formally decreeing all the Water 
Rights, in their entirety, to South County Estates. The place of use is on the 289 acres transferred 
to MWB and now owned by Belle Ranch. Based upon the foregoing, it is indisputable that no 
later than the summer of 2010, six and a half years before these cases were filed, the SRBA 
Court made findings and rulings adverse to the claims that Appellants now assert.  
The other clearly “adverse” claim to Appellants is that the water rights were and are 
appurtenant to Belle Ranch Property.  The continued possession and use of all these water rights 
by someone other than Appellants is certainly adverse.  Belle Ranch began using and paying for 
the water right to use the water in the 2012 irrigation season.  Belle Ranch submitted its change 
of ownership and transfer application with IDWR in February 2012, more than four years before 
the quiet title action s were filed. 
In Brown v. Greenheart, Brown had possession of the real property and used the water 
rights.  It was not until Greenheart filed a notice with IDWR claiming an interest in the water 
rights, based on an alleged error in the deed, that Greenheart’s adverse claim arose and the time 
in which Brown could file a quiet tittle lawsuit began to run. In this case, Belle Ranch actually 
had possession of the property, paid the taxes and assessments, and used all the Water Rights. 
---
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Appellants did not. These acts of ownership and possession are adverse to Appellants’ claims of 
title and ownership of the Water Rights.  The Appellants knew these facts, and knew that they 
were not using the water. They were not billed by the Water District, even though South County 
had been billed when it owned and used the water. R. 1061-63.  Appellants were also on notice 
of the adverse claim by Belle Ranch’s use and possession no later than the start of the 2012 
irrigation season.   
In 2010, the Belle Ranch Property with all appurtenant Water Rights was conveyed to 
MWB, and thence to GBCI. R 1460; R. 660.  MWB filed a notice of change of ownership with 
IDWR claiming all the water rights in July 2011, five and a half years before the quiet title action 
was filed.  R. 1175-82.  On December 22, 2011, the Belle Ranch Property and all appurtenant 
water rights was conveyed to Belle Ranch LLC.  R. 680-84.  Belle Ranch the filed its Notice of 
Change of Ownership with IDWR on February 28, 2012, as provided in I.C. § 42-1409(6).  R. 
1186.  Thus, Belle Ranch asserted a claim to the Water Rights adverse to Appellants, their 
predecessors, and to South County.  Shortly thereafter, in April 2012, Belle Ranch filed a 
Transfer Application with IDWR, claiming ownership of these same Water Rights.  R. 717.  That 
transfer application was properly noticed in the Mountain Express. Id. at 747.  Appellants thus 
had at least constructive notice of Belle Ranch’s claims no later than April 2012, four and one-
half years before filing their quiet title actions. 
 “[T]he purpose of a statute of limitations in general is to prevent fraudulent and stale 
claims from arising after a great lapse of time while preserving for a reasonable period the right 
to pursue a claim.” Hawley v. Green, 117 Idaho 498, 501, 788 P.2d 1321, 1324 (1990).  
Ownership of the Belle Ranch Property and appurtenant water rights are in control of and in the 
name of Belle Ranch. Any one of the aforementioned notices were adequate to give Appellants 
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proper notice of the adverse claims to the Water Rights and would have caused the cause of 
action for quiet title to commence accruing. Appellants had multiple notices of the adverse 
claims to the Water Rights and did not take any action. Appellants had four years to file an 
action to quiet title and failed to do so, and their claims are now barred. I.C. § 5-224. 
Appellants’ quiet title claims should be dismissed by the Court as time-barred by the four 
year statute of limitations, and ownership of the Water Rights should be confirmed in the name 
of Belle Ranch.  
I. The District Court’s Order Granting Belle Ranch’s Motion for Summary Judgment 
Should be Affirmed Because Appellants’ Claims Should be Denied Pursuant to the 
Doctrines of Equitable Estoppel, Quasi Estoppel, and/or Waiver.  
 
Equitable estoppel arises:  
[w]hen a party makes a false representation or concealment of a material fact with 
actual or constructive knowledge of the truth; it is made with the intent that it be 
relied upon; the party asserting estoppel does not know or could not discover the 
truth; and the party asserting estoppel relies on it to the party's prejudice. 
Allen v. Reynolds, 145 Idaho 807, 812, 186 P.3d 663, 668 (2008)(quoting Hecla Min. Co. v. 
Star–Morning Min. Co., 122 Idaho 778, 782, 839 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1992)).  
The doctrine of quasi-estoppel is distinguishable from equitable estoppel in that “no 
concealment or misrepresentation of existing facts on the one side, nor ignorance or reliance on 
the other, is a necessary ingredient.” Schiewe v. Farwell, 125 Idaho 46, 49, 867 P.2d 920, 923 
(1993)(quoting Obray v. Mitchell, 98 Idaho 533, 538, 567 P.2d 1284, 1289 (1977). To prove 
quasi-estoppel, it is not necessary to show detrimental reliance; instead, there must be evidence 
that it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to assert allegedly contrary 
positions.” Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 114, 138 P.3d 310, 314 (2006) (quoting Thomas v. 
Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho at 357, 48 P.3d at 1246). Quasi-estoppel applies when: (1) the 
offending party took a different position than his or her original position, and (2) either (a) the 
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offending party gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other 
party was induced to change positions; or (c) it would be unconscionable to permit the offending 
party to maintain an inconsistent position from one he or she has already derived a benefit or 
acquiesced in. C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 145, 75 P.3d 194, 199 
(2003). 
Waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage. Nelson 
v. Hopper, 86 Idaho 115, 383 P.2d 588 (1963); Crouch v. Bischoff, 78 Idaho 364, 304 P.2d 646 
(1956). Waiver does not necessarily depend on any new or additional consideration. Hawkins v. 
Smith, 35 Idaho 349, 205 P. 188 (1922). See Idaho Bank of Commerce v. Chastain, 86 Idaho 146, 
383 P.2d 849 (1963) (waiver arising out of conduct partakes of the nature of estoppel, and no 
consideration is necessary). “Even though consideration is not necessary to establish a waiver, it 
must appear that the adversary party has acted in reliance upon such a waiver and altered his 
position.”  Brand S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731, 639 P.2d 429, 432 (1981).  
The undisputed facts in this case support quasi and equitable estoppel, and a waiver of 
any of Appellants’ claims to the Water Rights. John Scherer, the managing member of South 
County, executed an Estoppel Certificate, recognizing that South County had delivered and 
deeded the entirety of the Belle Ranch Property and appurtenances, including all water and water 
rights. R. 1049-52. The plain language is clear and unambiguous. It states:  
Included with the real property conveyed to Grantee: all erected or affixed 
buildings, improvements and fixtures; all easements, rights of way, and 
appurtenances; all water, water rights, watercourses and ditch rights (including 
stock in utilities with ditch or irrigation rights), and all other rights, royalties and 
profits relating to the conveyed real property, including without limitation all 
minerals, oil, gas, geothermal and similar matters, collective; including any after-
acquired title and any right of redemption. Partial Release of Water Rights 
recorded as Instrument. No’s 568681, 574997, 574998, 574999, 575000, 
575001, records of Blaine County, Idaho.  
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 R. 1050 (emphasis added).  
An estoppel certificate is “[a] signed statement by a party (such as a tenant or a 
mortgagee) certifying for another's benefit that certain facts are correct, such as that a lease 
exists, that there are no defaults, and that rent is paid to a certain date. A party's delivery of this 
statement estops that party from later claiming a different state of facts.” Pocatello Hosp., LLC v. 
Quail Ridge Med. Inv'r, LLC, 156 Idaho 709, 716, 330 P.3d 1067, 1074 (2014) (quoting Black's 
Law Dictionary 6319 (9th ed.2009)).  
South County’s Estoppel Certificate further stated that included in the transfer were 
“Partial Release of Water Rights recorded as Instrument Nos. 568681, 574996, 574998, 574999, 
575000 and 575001. Consideration for the Deed in Lieu included a covenant not to sue on all 
three mortgages as well as “release of the guaranty liability of John Scherer, Richard D. Fosbury, 
and Charles Holt.” R 1050.  The estoppel certificate further recited that the certificate was made 
for the purpose of “inducing” MWB to accept this Deed in Lieu. R 1052.  MWB relied on this 
inducement and accepted the Deed in Lieu. 
MWB then submitted an ownership change request to IDWR on July 27, 2011, which 
was processed and acknowledged on September 13, 2011 and resulted in the ownership of the 
entirety of the Water Rights being changed from South County Estates, LLC to MWB. R. 1184.  
After review of the IDWR records MWB’s counsel further advised that MWB acquired and was 
prepared to convey the entirety of the Water Rights for the 289 acres of the Property to Belle 
Ranch, R. 1709-11. 
Appellants are or claim to be successors to South County. As successors they are 
estopped from asserting any claim to the appurtenant Water Rights, and have waived any right to 
assert claims by virtue of South County’s Estoppel Certificate. R 1049-1052.  In other words, 
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because South County disclaimed any further interest in these Water Rights then Appellants 
necessarily did so too.  In addition, for the reasons discussed in the Statute of Limitations section 
H, supra, Appellants’ inactions between 2010 and the end of 2016 should likewise be grounds 
for waiver and estoppel of all of their claims to the Water Rights.  
J. The District Court’s Order Granting Belle Ranch’s Motion for Summary Judgment 
Should be Affirmed Because The District Court Was Correct in Determining 
Rabo’s Secured Interest in the 7.5/289ths Interest in the Water Rights Claimed by 
Appellant FSC.  
 
Appellant FSC argues that it is the successor in interest to IIB and as such its secured 
interests predate that of RABO’s interest. Opening Brief on Appeal, p. 39. Appellants’ request 
that any Judgment should omit reference to the secured interests of any creditor. Id.  
Appellant FSC is incorrect in its analysis. The reality is IIB’s mortgage and security 
interest was never recorded upon the real property, and is based upon a void conveyance—
Scherer and Holt did not have any property for the IIB mortgage to encumber, and later could not 
have quitclaimed any interest upon Scherer and Holt’s default.  
Appellants have already acknowledged that the second and third mortgages were never 
released.  They try, however, to create ambiguity by alleging a MWB Letter Agreement. 
Opening Brief on Appeal, p. 39. The partial releases are clear on their face, and are the only 
documents recorded, or that which would have put Belle Ranch and the public on notice, 
including RABO.  RABO loaned money to Belle Ranch to acquire the property and Water 
Rights, and it was entitled as a good faith purchaser to rely upon the public record which showed 
that Belle Ranch owned the property and Water Rights, and therefore could pledge them to 
RABO, free and clear of prior liens and claims. If FSC wishes to litigate against IIB, and/or 
MWB for breach of some alleged letter agreement—this is of no consequence to Belle Ranch 
and RABO, and likely beyond any statute of limitations. The deeds and partial releases are clear 
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and unambiguous. As explained in Jolley v. Idaho Sec., Inc., 90 Idaho 373, 383–84, 414 P.2d 
879, 885 (1966), the general rule is that a deed “is considered as a merger of the agreements of 
an antecedent contract into the terms of the deed, and any claim for relief must be based on the 
covenants or agreements contained in the deed, not the covenants or agreements as contained in 
the prior agreement.”  
Unfortunately for FSC and IIB, they attempted to record secured interests that were 
unsecured upon void property.  In short, this Court should affirm not only that Belle Ranch owns 
the entirety of these Water Rights, but that the entirety of the Water Rights are encumbered by 
RABO’s properly perfected lien. 
K. This Court Should Grant Belle Ranch an award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs on 
Appeal 
 
 Pursuant to I.C. § 12-121, Idaho Appellate Rules 40, 41 and 35, Belle Ranch requests an 
award of attorney’s fees and costs upon appeal. “The Court will award fees to a prevailing party 
under Idaho Code section 12–121 when the Court believes that the action was pursued, defended, 
or brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.” Thornton v. Pandrea, 161 Idaho 
301, 320, 385 P.3d 856, 875 (2016)(quoting Sweet v. Foreman, 761, 767, 367 P.3d 156, 162 
(2016)). Appellants have done just that. Appellants have pursed this lawsuit and appeal without a 
sound legal or factual theory in the face of overwhelming legal precedent and clear statutory 
requirements.   
They have omitted both facts and law contrary to their arguments and have essentially re-
hashed the arguments that were unpersuasive to the district court. On appeal, the Court has 
granted fees where the nonprevailing party “continued to rely on the same arguments used in 
front of the district court, without providing any additional persuasive law or bringing into doubt 
the existing law on which the district court based its decision.” Thornton v. Pandrea, 161 Idaho 
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301, 320, 385 P.3d 856, 875 (2016)(quoting Castrigno v. McQuade, 141 Idaho 93, 98, 106 P.3d 
419, 424 (2005)). This Court can see that Appellants raised the same arguments that previously 
failed before the district court.  They are simply rehashing its same old arguments.  There is 
nothing here. Lastly, there are numerous theories upon which Belle Ranch still prevails upon its 
claims, and therefore Appellants have clearly pursued this lawsuit on appeal frivolously.  
Belle Ranch should be awarded its reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 Belle Ranch bought the property and all the Appurtenant Water Rights.  Ever since it has 
used all the Appurtenant Water Rights on its property.  It followed the requirements of the 
adjudication statutes and it processed a transfer without any one objecting.  The Final Decree 
was entered.  More than two years after the Final Decree along came FSC asserting claims to 
portions of the Water Rights appurtenant to the Belle Ranch Property.  Its claims are based on 
void quitclaims.  Whatever scheme South County, its members and financiers have concocted, it 
is not sufficient to overcome the bonafide purchase by Belle Ranch or the SRBA and IDWR 
proceedings. 
 This Court should affirm the decisions of the district court and further grant the Belle 
Ranch attorney’s fees and costs on appeal.  
 DATED this 9th day of May, 2019. 
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10/26/1988 1130-41 Notice of Claim to Water Right G. Chapman Petersen SRBA 
10/09/2003 970-
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Notice of Change in Water Right Ownership South County  IDWR 
2007 1143-47 Recommendations of Water Right Director IDWR SRBA 
06/28/2010 1149-56 Special Master’s Report and Recommendation  SRBA SRBA 
07/09/2010 1158-65 Amended Special Master’s Report and Recommendation SRBA SRBA 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CA.MAS 
JUDY CASH, an unmarried woman, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
PHILIP CASH and DEBRA CASH, 
husband and wife, and Does 1-5, 
unknown persons who may claim 
interest, 
Respondents. 
) Case No: CV-2016-02 
) 
) ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENTS' 













1. On January 26, 2017, Judge Elgee entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law in this matter. The facts set forth in the Findings of Fact are incorporated herein by 
reference and will not be repeated. Among other things, Judge Elgee quieted title to all or 
portions of water right numbers 37-444, 37-2541, and 37-7636, in the Petitioner. 1 
2. Then, on August 17, 2017, the case was reassigned to this Court following Judge 
Elgee's retirement. 
3. On September 1, 201 7, the Respondents filed a Motion asking the Court to 
reconsider Judge Elgee's determination regarding ownership of the water rights. The Petitioner 
opposes the Motion. A hearing on the Motion was held before the Court on September 29, 2017. 
1 On May 23, 2017, Judge Elgee entered Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Ownership of Twin 
Lakes Reservoir & Irrigation Company Shares. The Amended Findings do not change or address his decision with 
respect to water right numbers 37-444, 37-2541, and 37-7636. 
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This proceeding involves a dispute over the ownership of water right numbers 37-444, 
37-2541, and 37-7636. These water rights were previously decreed in the Snake River Basin 
Adjudication ("SRBA") to Respondent Philip Cash. Notwithstanding, Judge Elgee subsequently 
quieted title in the rights to the Petitioner based on pre-decree considerations. In doing so, Judge 
El gee off ended principles of res judicata by failing to place appropriate weight on the SRBA 
proceeding and the water right decrees entered as a result of that proceeding. 
A. SRBA proceeding. 
The SRBA was a general adjudication commenced on November 19, 1987. All water 
users within the adjudication boundaries were required to file claims for existing water uses in 
the adjudication. In 1989, Philip Cash filed notices of claim for the three water rights at issue in 
the SRBA. He identified himself as the sole claimant of the rights in his claims. On December 
5, 2006, the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources issued his recommendations 
for the claims. He recommended the claims be decreed in the name of Philip Cash as sole 
owner. The Petitioner did not object to the Director's recommendations, and the time for doing 
so has expired. 
On September 24, 2010, the SRBA District Court entered Partial Decrees for the water 
rights consistent with the Director's recommendations. The Partial Decrees vest ownership of 
the water rights in Philip Cash as sole owner, and were Rule 54(b) certified as final judgments 
subject to appeal. The Petitioner did not appeal the issuance of the Partial Decrees and the time 
for doing so has passed. Additionally, the Petitioner has not sought relief from the Partial 
Decrees before the SRBA District Court at any time. On August 26, 2014, the Court entered the 
SRBA Final Unified Decree which, save certain exceptions not applicable here, completed the 
adjudication. Again the Petitioner has neither appealed, nor sought relief from, the Final Unified 
Decree. 
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B. Principles of res judicata preclude the Petitioner from asserting she is the owner of 
the water rights in this proceeding. 
The doctrine of res judicata covers both claim preclusion and issue preclusion. 
Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). Claim preclusion bars a 
subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim or upon claims "relating to the 
same cause of action ... which might have been made." Id. Issue preclusion protects litigants 
from litigating an identical issue with the same party or its privy. Rodriguez v. Dep't. of Corr., 
136 Idaho 90, 92, 29 P.3d 401,403 (2001). 
For claim preclusion to bar a subsequent action there are three requirements: (1) same 
parties; (2) same claim; and (3) final judgment. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanton, 144 Idaho 119, 124, 
157 P.3d 613,618 (2007). For issue preclusion to bar the relitigation of an issue determined in a 
prior proceeding there are five requirements: (1) the party against whom the earlier decision was 
asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the 
issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) 
the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; ( 4) there was a final 
judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted 
was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation. Id. Whether res judicata bars the 
re litigation of issues adjudicated in prior litigation between the same parties is a question of law 
over which the Court exercises free review. Lohman v. Flynn, 139 Idaho 312,319, 78 P.3d 379, 
386 (2003). The Court finds the requirements res judicata to be met here. 
i. Parties. 
Philip Cash and Judy Cash were both parties to the SRBA. In a general adjudication, a 
party is defined as "any person who is a claimant or any person who is served or joined." J.C.§ 
42-1401A(6). Philip Cash claimed and was decreed the water rights at issue here in the SRBA. 
Water right numbers 37-21701, 37-1692, 37-21683, 37-21674, and 37-2166 were claimed by and 
decreed to Judy Cash in the SRBA. Thus, both individuals filed water right claims in, and were 
decreed water rights as a result of, the adjudication. 
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ii. Claims, issues and rmal judgment. 
This proceeding and the SRBA involve the same claims and issues. When the SRBA was 
commenced, the SRBA District Court obtained the exclusive jurisdiction "to resolve all of the 
water right claims within the scope of the general adjudication." Walker v. Big Lost River Irr. 
Dist., 124 Idaho 78, 81,856 P.2d 868,871 (1993). The water rights at issue here are located in 
Basin 37, which is part of the Snake River Basin water system. As a result, they fell within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the SRBA District Court. The water rights were claimed, adjudicated, 
and decreed in the SRBA. This is undisputed. The Partial Decrees issued for the rights were 
certified as final judgments in 2010, and the SRBA proceeding itself was completed upon entry 
of the Final Unified Decree in 2014. Thus, both the subcases involving these individual water 
rights and the main adjudication proceeding were finalized prior to the commencement of the 
instant action. 
Notwithstanding, it is the Petitioner's position that the SRBA District Court did not 
address or adjudicate the issue of ownership of the many water rights claimed in the 
adjudication. The Court disagrees. Under Idaho law, water rights are defined by elements. City 
of Blaclifoot v. Spackman, 162 Idaho 302,397, 396 P.3d 1184, 1189 (2017). The name and 
address of the owner is one of those defining elements. LC.§§ 42-141 l(Z)(a) & 42-1412(6). 
The legislature directed that a decree issued in the SRBA "shall contain or incorporate a 
statement of each element of a water right . ... " I.C. § 42-1412 ( emphasis added). This would 
of course include the owner of the right. The legislature has further directed that a decree 
entered in a general adjudication "shall be conclusive as to the nature and extent of all water 
rights in the adjudicated water system .... " I.C. § 42-1420(1). 
Here, the precise question of ownership of these water rights was finally resolved in the 
SRBA. The water rights were claimed by Philip Cash as sole owner. The rights were then 
investigated by the Department, after which the Director recommended that the claims be 
decreed to Philip Cash as sole owner. Then, in 2010, the SRBA District Court entered a Partial 
Decree for each right identifying Philip Cash as sole owner. If the Petitioner believed she 
acquired ownership of these water rights in 2002, she failed to timely assert her alleged 
ownership interest as required by law. Idaho Code§ 42-248(1) directs in part as follows: 
All persons owning or claiming ownership of a right to use the water of this state, 
whether the right is represented by decree of the court, by claim to a water right 
filed with the department of water resources or by permit or license issued by the 
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director of the department of water resources, shall provide notice to the 
department of water resources of any change in ownership of any part of the water 
right or of any change in the owner's mailing address, either of which occurs after 
June 30, 2000. Notice shall be provided within one hundred twenty (120) days of 
any change using forms acceptable to the director. 
Likewise, with respect to ownership changes taking place during a general adjudication, Idaho 
Code§ 42-1409(6) directs: 
Each purchaser of a water right from the water system shall inquire of the director 
whether a notice of claim has been filed, and if not, shall file a notice of claim in 
accordance with this section. All claimants and purchasers shall provide the 
director written notice of any change in ownership or of any change in mailing 
address during the pendency of a general adjudication. All purchasers shall 
submit some evidence of ownership along \\ith the notice of change of ownership. 
These statutes are mandatory. Paolini v. Albertson's Inc., 143 Idaho 547, 549, 149 P.3d 822, 824 
(2006). 
Here, the Petitioner asserts she acquired the subject water rights via quit claim deed in 
2002. Yet, at no time prior to commencing this action in 2016 did she assert ownership via the 
filing of a notice of change of ownership with the Department as required by Idaho Code § 42-
248. Nor did she inquire of the Director whether notices of claim for these right had been filed 
in the SRBA, or otherwise comply with the requirements ofldaho Code§ 42-1409(6) despite 
acquiring the rights during the pendency of the SRBA. Had the Petitioner timely taken either of 
these statutorily-required actions, the Director would have taken her ownership assertions into 
account when making his recommendation for these rights in the SRBA. 
Further, it cannot be said that the Petitioner did not have the full and fair opportunity to 
raise the issue of ownership of these water rights in the SRBA. It must be noted that despite 
being a party to the SRBA, the Petitioner did not object to the Director's recommendations for 
these claims in 2006, when he recommended that they be decreed to Philip Cash as sole owner. 
If the Petitioner believed she was the rightful owner of the water rights at that time, she was 
required to file objections to the recommendations with the SRBA District Court "within the 
time specified in the notice of filing of the director's report." I.C. § 42-1412(1). She did not 
despite having the full and fair opportunity to do so. Nor did she seek reconsideration of, or 
appeal from, the Court's issuance of the Partial Decrees for these rights in 2010, though they 
identified Philip Cash as sole owner. Had the Petitioner timely taken any of these actions, the 
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issue of ownership would have been addressed in a timely manner and on a fresh record in the , 
SRBA. 
Instead, the Petitioner sat on her rights for approximately 15 years without action. 
During that time the pertinent record grew stale and the delay worked to the detriment of Philip 
Cash who properly asserted his ownership interests in the SRBA. It wa~ not until 2016 that the 
Petitioner asserted her ownership interests by initiating this proceeding. However, by that time 
the rights had been decreed to Philip Cash in the SRBA. Her attempt to dispute the propriety of 
the Partial Decrees in this proceeding constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the 
Partial Decrees.2 See e.g., Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890,894,277 P.3d 337, 341 (2012) 
(stating generally, that "final judgments, whether right or wrong, are not subject to collateral 
attack"). The Court holds that the Petitioner sat on her rights for too long and failed to timely 
assert her ownership interests in the proper forum -the SRBA. As a result, principles of res 
judicata preclude the Petition .from asserting she is the owner of the water rights in this 
proceeding based on pre-decree considerations. 
iii. Judge Elgee's decision and the Petitioner's attempt to relitigate ownership of 
the water rights offend the fundamental purposes of the doctrine of res 
judicata. 
In his decision, Judge Elgee recognized that the water rights placed at issue in this 
proceeding were adjudicated in the SRBA. Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, p.17. He 
also acknowledged that the rights were decreed to Philip Cash in that proceeding. Id. 
Notwithstanding, he placed no weight or significance on the Partial Decrees issued in the SRBA 
or on the SRBA proceeding itself. To the contrary, he allowed the parties to relitigate the issue 
of ownership based on pre-decree considerations. Such a result cannot stand. 
Res judicata serves three fundamental purposes: ( 1) it preserves the acceptability of 
judicial dispute resolution against the corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same matter 
were twice litigated to inconsistent results; (2) it serves the public interest in protecting the courts 
against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and (3) it advances the private interest in repose 
from the harassment of repetitive claims. Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 124, 157 P.3d at 618. 
Here all the policy rationales behind res judicata have been thwarted. Ownership of these water 
2 At no time did the Petitioner attempt to seek relief from the Partial Decrees in the SRBA District Court under 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60. 
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rights has now been litigated twice in two separate forums resulting in the unnecessary 
expenditure of resources by both the parties and the judiciary. The two litigations have resulted 
in inconsistent decisions, with the SRBA District Court decreeing the rights to Philip Cash, and a 
separate district court quieting title to the same rights in Judy Cash. Allowing Judge Elgee's 
decision to stand would set a dangerous precedent, whereby parties to the SRBA may simply go 
to an outside forum to relitigate basic elements of water rights decreed in the adjudication. Such 
a precedent would make the Partial Decrees entered in the SRBA, as well as the adjudication 
proceeding itself, worthless. 3 Therefore, based on the foregoing, the Court will grant the 
Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration and find that the principles of res judicata preclude the 
Petition from asserting she is the owner of the water right numbers 37-444, 37-2541, and 37-
7636. 
C. Idaho Code§ 42-1402. 
Judge Elgee relied upon Idaho Code§ 42-1402 in making his determination that the 
Petitioner is the owner of the subject water rights. That statute provides that a water right 
confirmed by a decree "shall be appurtenant to and shall become part of the land on which the 
water is used, and such right will pass with the conveyance of such land, and such decree shall 
describe the land to which such water shall become so appurtenant." I.C. § 42-1402. The Court 
holds that the proper time for the Petitioner to have presented her Idaho Code § 42-1402 
argument was during the SRBA, not this proceeding. When the Director recommended that the 
subject water rights be decreed to Philip Cash as sole owner in the SRBA, the Petitioner was 
required to file a timely objection if she disagreed with the recornrnendations.4 LC. § 42-
1412(1). To support her objections, she could have properly cited Idaho Code§ 42-1402 in 
support of her ownership claims at that time. However, the Petitioner sat on her rights, failed to 
object, and did not assert any ownership interest in the subject water rights until 2016. For the 
3 The Court notes that changes to the elements of water rights adjudicated in the SRBA based on post-decree factors 
and considerations are properly processed through the Idaho Department of Water Resources under statutes that 
include but are not limited to Idaho Code§§ 42-248(1) and 42-222. 
4 It must be remembered that had the Petitioner complied with the requirements of either Idaho Code §§ 42-248(1) 
and/or § 42-1409(6) when she acquired the subject property in 2002, it is likely the Director would have 
recommended the subject water rights in her name in the SRBA as opposed to Philip Cash, and this whole problem 
would have been avoided. But the Petitioner did not comply with those statutes when she acquired the property. 
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reasons stated above, principles of res judicata preclude her from now asserting O\\-'!lership 
interests that were required to be previously raised and asserted in the SRBA. 
The Court further notes that while the appurtenance of a water right to a particular piece 
of land may be relevant to determining the ownership of that water right in some circumstances, 
it is not in and of itself dispositive of the issue of ownership in all circumstances. It is true that 
very often the owner of a piece of land is also the O\\-'!ler of the water rights appurtenant to that 
land. However, it can be equally true that the owner of a piece of land is not the owner of the 
water rights appurtenant to that land. Indeed, it has long been held that "water may be 
appropriated for beneficial use on land not owned by the appropriator, and this water right 
becomes the property of the appropriator." First Security Bank of Blacifoot v. State, 49 Idaho 
740,291 P. 1064 (1930). Thus, Idaho law recognizes there may be a bifurcation between 
ownership of the land and of the water right used on the land. Id. It follows that the term 
"appurtenance" signifies that the use of a water right is tied to a particular piece of land (i.e., 
place of use), and may not be used on another piece ofland without first obtaining a transfer to 
do so. It does not signify, as argued by the Petitioner, that the o\\-'!ler of piece of land served by a 
water right is by operation of law the owner of that water right in all circumstances. Reading the 
term "appurtenance" in this fashion is contrary to Idaho's long recognition that there may be a 
bifurcation between o\\-'!lership of the land and of the water right used on the land. Accordingly, 
the proper time to raise this issue was in the SRBA proceeding. 
D. The Court need not reach the alternate legal theories advanced by the Respondents. 
In addition to res judicata, the Respondents raise alternate theories of laches and statute 
of limitations in their Motion. Because the Court finds the Petitioner is clearly precluded from 
asserting o\\-'!lership of water right numbers 37-444, 37-2541, and 37-7636 in this proceeding 
under principles of res judicata, it does not reach the alternate theories raised by the 
Respondents. 
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Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that the Respondents' Motion/or Reconsideration is hereby 
granted. 
IT IF FURTHER ORDERED that the Petitioner's claims asserting ownership of water 
right numbers 37-444, 37-2541, and 37-7636 are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
Dated Oc.4o\w.. 1'!> 1 20l7 ~ _ 
CJ. WIDMAN 
District Judge 
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